Retirement Planning and Your Finances

Credit Cards: Having a credit card is often a necessity for most senior citizens – from paying for medicine and emergencies to booking a vacation. But for seniors living on a fixed income, there are concerns about carrying a large balance from month to month and running up significant interest charges. In the worst cases, the debt becomes unmanageable and a major source of stress for the account holder and the family. Another problem for seniors is having too many credit cards. That's because the more cards you have, the more opportunities you have to get into debt. And that possibility could make it tougher for you to get the best deal the next time you apply for a loan, insurance, a mortgage or an apartment. Having a lot of cards also can make it harder to keep track of when your monthly payments are due or to even realize that a thief may have stolen one of your cards. Home Equity Loans and Lines of Credit: These are loans that use the equity in your house as collateral and often are tax deductible (check with your tax advisor). The equity refers to the difference between what you owe on a house and its current market value. A home equity loan is a one-time loan for a lump sum, typically at a fixed interest rate. A home equity line of credit works like a credit card in that you can borrow as much as you want up to a pre-set credit limit. The interest rate for a line of credit usually is variable, meaning it could increase or decrease in the future. "For elderly people on a fixed income who have paid their mortgage in full or whose mortgage is almost paid in full, home equity loans are tempting to use to pay for expenses, but they can also be dangerous," warned Janet Kincaid, FDIC Senior Consumer Affairs Officer. "In the worst-case scenario, if you are unable to make the required loan payments, you could lose your home." In general, the best uses for home equity-type loans are to purchase goods or services with long-term benefits, such as home improvements that add to the value of your property. The riskiest uses of home equity loans include a vacation or a car because you could end up paying a lot in interest charges for a purchase that's only of short-term value or has gone down in value. Also beware that some unscrupulous people or companies (including home repair contractors) push high-cost, high-risk home equity loans to elderly people and other consumers. Reverse Mortgages: These are home equity loans available to homeowners age 62 or older. In general, a reverse mortgage is a loan that provides money that can be used for any purpose, and the principal and interest payments typically become due when you move, sell your house or die. A reverse mortgage also differs from other home loans in that you don't need an income to qualify and you don't have to make monthly repayments. While reverse mortgages can be a valuable source of funds, they also have serious potential drawbacks. In particular, you will be reducing your equity, perhaps substantially, after you add in the interest costs. "Reverse mortgages can help in some situations, such as when you have large medical bills that are not covered, to make major home repairs or to help people on low fixed-incomes make ends meet," said Cynthia Angell, a Senior Financial Economist at the FDIC. "However, you are reducing your ownership share of the home. That means the inheritance you are leaving to your heirs could be greatly diminished or you could have far less money available for other purposes, such as buying into a retirement community later on. That's why a reverse mortgage should usually be used as a last resort, not as an integral part of a retirement strategy." Also, Angell said, the fees can be high, and that could make a reverse mortgage a poor choice to cover relatively small expenses. Life Insurance: People mostly think about life insurance as a source of income when someone dies, but they forget that many insurance policies also can be a source of cash at other times. If you have a life insurance policy with built-up cash value, you can borrow against that money and either repay the loan with interest or reduce the death benefit accordingly. Example: If you have a $100,000 life insurance policy but you owe $20,000 on a loan from that policy, your heirs would receive $80,000 as the insurance payout. There are other options reserved for people who have been diagnosed with a terminal illness and have run out of other ways to pay their expenses. One example is a life insurance policy that can pay "accelerated death benefits" to an eligible policy holder — generally up to about 50 percent of the face value of the policy — in either a lump-sum payment or monthly payments that are deducted from the policy's face value. When the policy holder dies, the rest of the death benefit is paid out. Another possibility is to "sell" your life insurance policy to obtain a lump-sum of about 40 to 80 percent of the face value in exchange for the right to receive the full insurance payout when you die. This is known in the insurance business as a "viatical settlement." These and other options for tapping life insurance policies can be complicated (including tax and other implications), and they are not right for everyone. Consider getting guidance from your state government's insurance regulator.

On Banks

Copyright 2006 Geoff Gannon Superficially, banking appears to be a commodity business. In fact, it appears to be a particularly poor commodity business, because capacity is not constrained by the need to invest in a substantial physical infrastructure. True, whatever investments are made in tangible assets are usually intended as a means to acquire more intangible assets; however, a branch is hardly comparable to an oil well. A bank’s ability to lend money (and thus produce income) is not completely and inextricably linked to the size of its deposits. In other words, loans are the result of both a bank’s capacity to lend money and its willingness to lend money. It’s hard to find a parallel in tangible commodity businesses. Theoretically, this should make little difference in the long run. However, the lack of physical supply constraints in the market for loans creates the possibility for large, industry-wide mistakes. Pricing in such an industry can get very weak at times. There’s one catch here. The underlying assumption whenever the commodity business label is used is that both the demand for a product and the supply of that product are general in nature. They can’t be specific, because that would destroy the involuntary nature of pricing within the industry. For example, if all pineapples were unbranded, identically tasting fruits the demand side of the business would meet the requirement for a commodity business. However, if most pineapples take eighteen months to grow, but there is one magical plantation where the fruit develops fully in just three months, the supply side of the business does not meet the requirement for a true commodity business. The magical pineapple plantation would produce six times as much fruit per acre and thus the plantation owner would be able to undercut his competitor’s prices. He would earn extraordinary profits, because the return on capital in his business would be much higher than that of the industry as a whole. What does this fairy tale have to do with banking? It suggests extraordinary profits can come from having “sticky” customers or lower costs. The lower costs needn’t be the result of lower marginal inputs. The magical pineapple plantation turned the crop over faster; it didn’t need access to below market prices for any of its inputs. The same is true of a grocery store. Two stores that buy and sell cans of soup at the same exact prices may have very different returns on capital, if one of the stores turns over its inventory more quickly, because the fixed costs will be spread over a larger number of sales. How does this relate to banking? While a quick turnover (or some other form of operational efficiency) is the most common reason for one firm’s unusual profitability in a commodity type business, there are other ways to earn extraordinary profits. Some of them are conceptually quite similar to the idea of owning a magical, one of a kind pineapple plantation. In such situations, the product appears the same to the consumer; but, the producer is actually unique (or at the very least special). All of this helps to explain why some banks are more profitable than others. However, it doesn’t address the question posed by Morningstar. So, do all banks have moats? Before answering that question, it might be best to ask under what circumstances all banks could have moats. What could insulate an entire industry from the ravages of competition? This is the question I discussed in the podcast episode: “Nature of Competition”. Why can some industries support plenty of profitable players, while others merely support a handful, one, or none? Switching costs are one of the most commonly cited reasons for a wide moat. I think the matter is actually a lot more complicated than that. Financially prohibitive switching costs do create moats. However, most wide-moat companies don’t have truly prohibitive switching costs. What they do have is a situation in which it makes little sense to switch to a competitor and/or a tendency for their customers to not actively seek to learn more about competing products. Where the cost of a product is particularly small per cash outlay, consumers are usually apathetic about seeking out alternatives. The key here is that the amount has to seem very small to the buyer at the time the purchase is made. If you buy a cup (or two) of coffee every morning, it does not occur to you that you are spending hundreds or thousands of dollars a year on that coffee and that you could save a lot of money by buying the cheaper alternative. However, if you’re buying an appliance or piece of furniture the difference is immediately obvious and thus price is a major concern. Generally, if a product can be sold over and over again at a very low price per transaction, profits will be higher, because the buyer will not make much of an effort to compare prices. Likewise, if a customer is billed for a variety of different products or services each amounting to only a small charge, the customer’s price awareness will be lower than if the charges were combined and listed as a single item. Where price visibility, comparability, or immediacy is reduced, greater profitability becomes more likely. People are very sensitive to price differences between large, juxtaposed numbers. If tomorrow the federal government prohibited gas stations from posting their prices per gallon, drivers would begin to become less concerned about gas prices. There would be an uproar at first. But, over the years, gas prices would receive less and less news coverage and would fall off the list of consumer concerns. Obviously, a crude oil price quoted in dollars also contributes to price awareness. But, the point remains the same. Where prices are less visible, price competition is less fierce. Compounding is a great way to exploit a lack of price awareness. The differences between various interest rates always seem small when placed side by side. Over time, these differences become quite large. However, the fact that no large differences are clearly visible at the time a decision is made about where to bank helps to minimize price competition between banks. It also increases the relative importance of other aspects of banking like convenience and service. Usually, the cost to make a good impression is very low compared to the size of the assets that could result from attracting more deposits. On the other hand, the importance of making a good second and third impression is minimal. Once a depositor uses a particular bank, they are unlikely to visit competitors. When they need to do their banking, they will go directly to their own bank (or its website). This is very different from the environment found in most consumer businesses. Packaged goods companies have their products placed next to their competitor’s products on store shelves. Retail stores are usually clustered. Whether they are located in malls or in free standing buildings, it’s a safe bet the customer has to pass at least one competing retail outlet to shop at their favorite location. In most cases, the other location won’t compete in every category as the customer’s favorite store; but, it will offer at least some competing products. As a result, the shopper is offered the option of switching every time she makes the trip. When someone walks into a bank, it’s usually their own bank. They don’t have any use for other banks (after all, their money isn’t there). The cost of switching banks isn’t very high. However, the amount of active effort required to make the switch is substantial. Switching banks isn’t as easy as switching toothpaste. But, more importantly, the alternative isn’t as obvious in banking. We all know other banks exist. But, unless we have a reason to consider switching from our current bank, we don’t even bother to check out the competition. The result is a very narrow, very real moat.

On Microsoft (MSFT)

Copyright 2006 Geoff Gannon Microsoft is a difficult situation for me to evaluate. I think the company still has a lot of growth ahead in some areas. But, that depends on where management wants to take it. There are three core businesses that are already well developed: Windows, Office, and Servers. The moat in the first two are wide. The Windows moat is huge. The business model in operating systems is great. You keep upgrading every few years; the hardware needn't progress for you to find things to tweak and get people to buy the next step up. It's insanely profitable. I think the new launch (Vista) will be bigger than people expect (eventually) in how it allows for cross selling other Microsoft products (but we'll see about that). I expect the press to be very negative at least until well after the launch, because there will always be some bugs and delays. Games Eventually, video games will be a big business for Microsoft. I hate the economics of the console business, but love the economics of the publishing (and development) side of things. I'm sorry to see that Microsoft didn't use its cash pile to buy up an established business here (publishers were cheap in the market a few years ago; an all cash deal would have worked well. Now, everyone thinks video games will be the next big thing). The console wars are going well for Microsoft. The two keys to establishing a dominant console are launching first and getting good games on your platform. We'll see how Sony (SNE) does this round, but I expect them to be the big loser. Nintendo may surprise here. I think the Xbox 360 and Nintendo's new console (Wii) will do very well. It'll be interesting to see the breakdown of the consoles in both the domestic and foreign markets. I think Sony may still be strong overseas, but could be in a much poorer position at the end of this round than they were with the PS2. Search Long-term I am optimistic about search. I think Google's position is much weaker than most people think. I don't think Microsoft will be the only one to benefit here. Search is a very natural cross sell with Windows. That's the direction everything seems to be headed in (combining online and desktop search). For future growth in terms of market share I think Microsoft is in a better position than either Yahoo (YHOO) or Google (GOOG). I also think we might see a couple other (largely unknown) search engines gain some share. I think Google's strength is its brand. Its dominance helps with advertisers more than users. I don't think it has a lock on users. Also, I think Google has been poorly positioned for doing much of anything outside of keyword search. I expect to see a lot more in the way of intelligent, social search inspired stuff. Years from now, much of search will have to be helping you find what you didn't know you wanted to find. Google is dominant in a different business: helping you find what you know you want to find (but don't know the name / location). The two types of search are very different. Both will be important, but the growth in other forms of search will be coming off a smaller base and will likely integrate with keyword search. Google has the most to lose here. Other Devices Microsoft wants to perform well on mobile devices and on your TV. Compared to competitors it is very strong in these respects. The strategy seems to be the one I would favor - to control the point of initial contact wherever software is used and then to only venture into the actual application or content side of the business where it is highly profitable to do so. In video games it will be highly profitable. In other areas it is less likely to be very profitable. I expect to see more generic, web-based applications. These will be less profitable for everyone. Office should hold up well, but not as well as Windows. Basically, Microsoft needs to take what it has in PCs and import that to TVs, Handheld Devices, Consoles, and the Web. That should be the strategy. I think that is the strategy. These aren't unrelated businesses that need to be broken up to unlock creativity (as some have suggested). Rather, the profit potential for each is greatly enhanced by being part of Microsoft. If you take these pieces apart they are worth very little. There would only be the three businesses I started off talking about and the console / games business. Internationally, there is going to be natural growth for Microsoft's dominant businesses. It won't be a tremendous growth rate, but it will be strong and will require virtually no additional investment to secure. Obsolescence Issues Overall, I like the future for software a lot more than hardware, because the marginal gains in the quality of hardware will slow greatly in the years ahead. The question isn't what can be done mathematically in terms of increasing specs; it's what that translates to for the user. We are reaching a point where the individual user will not directly see the benefits of increased hardware performance as clearly as he did in the past. Much of the research that goes in to this area will only serve to bring down prices and benefit memory intensive businesses - it will not provide as much of a "wow" factor for the user anymore. This is especially true in games. The situation in desktop applications is already such that improving the software design is where most gains will come from. Computing power is simply not a scarce resource for most individuals sitting at home or in a cubicle. Advances will benefit some users a lot and will trickle down to the end user (often via the web) through fast responses and cheap services. But, that's a barely noticeable change. You'll see something here akin to the kind of thing you see in the brokerage business. It won't be obvious, because price competition will never be as great in software. Generally, you'll just see the prices for doing anything electronically come down. That's very different from what we've seen over the last few decades, where you also had advancements that attracted new users, because they allowed developers to do something differently, not just more cheaply. This is a very long-term trend I'm worried about. It could weigh heavily on a business like Dell (DELL), because PCs are actually quite durable; once the rate of obsolescence slows, sales will have to slow as the cycle lengthens. Management I think Microsoft's management is absolutely the best in the business. In fact, I think it's one of the best in any business. It would be hard for me to find more than a handful of people I'd rather have managing a business I was part owner of. I also think the current arrangement is a good one. There is enough of a line between current operations and future investments in the Chairman / CEO split that investors will probably get the greatest benefit from the brilliance of the Chairman this way. Everyone underestimates Bill Gates. It's easy, because his great triumph came some time ago now. But, he's interested in building something lasting. I trust him more than anyone in tech without a question. He always impresses me whether he's talking about his own industry or some other topic. He has exactly the right kind of mind for someone running a business where the long-run is such a concern. Qualitatively, I think Microsoft scores close to perfectly. I could cite the profitability stats, but I won't, because you know they're better than almost any other business on the planet – and that's with a huge siphoning off of resources to investments in the future that aren't required to maintain the cash cow, wide-moat Windows franchise. Valuation Valuation is a bit more troubling. Microsoft is not at the point on an EV/EBIT basis where I'd be buying the stock if there was a risk of no extraordinarily profitable growth in the future. In other words, at the current price, it clearly makes for a bad bond. The key is earnings growth. I think you have to believe MSFT will have a real future in search, games, and non-PC devices that will fuel future, highly profitable growth. I think that future is there. As far as a truly large cap stock (say $10 billion or more) it's about as attractive as anything on the planet right now - and certainly it's the most attractive stock of any very large U.S. business. Even though Intel (INTC) and Dell are cheap looking, I don't like them nearly as much. Dell is an interesting situation, but I don't understand the business well enough. I have a better idea of where MSFT is headed – and I like it. Conclusion I don't own shares of MSFT. I won't be buying any either. I don't normally own such large stocks. I prefer much smaller businesses, because the mispricings tend to get more out of whack. You aren't going to see MSFT trade at an EV/EBIT of 7.5 or something like that, but you do sometimes get those chances in small (high quality) businesses. There are a lot of chances to find wild mispricings without much of the future being a concern. Those are the situations I prefer to invest in, because businesses like MSFT have an awfully large anchor with the amount of capital they've got – plus, they tend to be less likely to be wildly mispriced. However, if I had to own one business with a market cap of more than $10 billion and hold it for a lifetime I would buy Microsoft here without hesitation.

The Danger of Inflexible Enterprises

Copyright 2006 Geoff Gannon Whenever a large investment has been made in a particular area, whenever there is a lot capital, people, and ego tied up with some operation, the transition away from that operation is apt to be far slower than what an objective observer would have expected. As an investor, it’s easy to look at a corporation from afar and see the business the way a rational capital allocator would see it. But, very few people within the organization are able to take such a farsighted view. They are not able to asses the matter dispassionately. There are jobs at stake. There is the admission of defeat. And there is the question of identity. Just as importantly, these problems hang over the managers every day. Staying too long in a dying business is rarely the result of one major misstep – rather, it is the result of a series of seemingly innocent steps that merely serve to delay the inevitable. Recognizing the terrible importance of the inflexibility of an enterprise that is tied to a particular line of business, mode of production, or labor force is a difficult task. Many value investors have been caught in this trap. Some business appears to offer excellent value today; but, if it should cling too long to its old ways, that value will be destroyed. It’s tempting to think that managers will see the obvious danger, act to remedy the problem, and forever change the organization, before the inevitable occurs. But, that kind of thinking requires a leap of faith. It is too easy for the investor to believe what he wants to believe – to assume that somehow tomorrow will take care of itself. Even Warren Buffett, a man who has been ever vigilant in his efforts to avoid prolonged entanglements in businesses with poor economics, has suffered from delusions of an easy transition. There are probably three good examples of such delusions from Buffett’s career. Discussing only two will be sufficient (the third would be Baltimore department store Hochschild-Kohn). Buffett suffered from his most recent delusion in late 1993. That’s when Berkshire Hathaway acquired Dexter Shoe. Buffett now realizes that deal was a mistake. In the 2001 annual letter to shareholders he wrote: “I've made three decisions relating to Dexter that have hurt you in a major way: (1) buying it in the first place; (2) paying for it with stock and (3) procrastinating when the need for changes in its operations was obvious…Dexter, prior to our purchase - and indeed for a few years after - prospered despite low-cost foreign competition that was brutal. I concluded that Dexter could continue to cope with that problem, and I was wrong.” Buffett lists three separate decisions. I don’t think the way he presents the Dexter Shoe debacle is simply a thoughtless arrangement. Buffett is admitting he shouldn’t have bought Dexter Shoe at all. He shouldn’t have bought it with stock or cash. His purchase was based on a false premise. It wasn’t simply a matter of overpaying (by using stock). It’s also interesting to note the third decision he describes: “procrastinating when the need for changes in its operations was obvious”. That’s a pretty harsh admission. Buffett refers to procrastinating as a decision. No doubt it was a daily decision, not a one-time choice between two separate paths; nevertheless, it was a costly decision. Excusing inaction as being somehow a lesser offense than an incorrect action is a common occurrence in business; but, it is not a productive way to learn from one’s own mistakes. Especially in investing, inaction must be judged just as harshly as action. The most interesting part of all this is the fact that Buffett separates the purchase itself from his failure to push for change at Dexter Shoe. He does not suggest that buying the business and then trying to change it would have worked well. Buffett seems to be saying the best course would have been not to buy the business in the first place. I think he’s right. The risks involved in purchasing an inflexible business are difficult to quantify. However, they are real. These risks are frequently large enough to destroy any apparent value that comes in the form of a bargain price relative to high current earnings (or cash flow). A business that is purchased because it can throw off cash can quickly become a money pit. Often, the buyer is well aware of this possibility. However, he manages to convince himself that the necessary transition will be made with the speed demanded by a rational assessment of the facts and a desire to put capital to its best possible use. Operating managers rarely see things so clearly. Even when the road ahead is clear, the will is often lacking. It is easy to rationalize decisions that seem to offer a middle course. A gradual transition is always a tempting possibility. Who wouldn’t want to convince themself that a retreat is really a fighting withdrawal? In the 1985 annual letter to shareholders, Buffett gave Berkshire’s reasons for remaining in the textile business as long as it did: “(1) Our textile businesses are very important employers in their communities, (2) management has been straightforward in reporting on problems and energetic in attacking them, (3) labor has been cooperative and understanding in facing our common problems, and (4) the business should average modest cash returns relative to investment.” “It turned out I was very wrong about (4)…I won’t close down a business of sub-normal profitability merely to add a fraction of a point to out corporate rate of return. However, I also feel it is inappropriate for even an exceptionally profitable company to fund an operation once it appears to have unending losses in prospect.” The delusion Buffett suffered under was only in regard to his fourth reason for remaining in the textile business. The belief that modest returns will be realized from a sub-par business is an attractive one. A rational assessment of the facts would have lead to the opposing conclusion. Past experience demonstrated that apparent possibilities of future profitability based on greater efficiencies and improved conditions within the industry rarely lead to any actual profits. There was always hope. But, there was rarely any proof that such hope was justified. “Over the years, we had the option of making large capital expenditures in the textile operation that would have allowed us to somewhat reduce variable costs. Each proposal to do so looked like an immediate winner. Measured by standard return-on-investment tests, in fact, these proposals usually promised greater economic benefits than would have resulted from comparable expenditures in our highly-profitable candy and newspaper businesses…But the promised benefits from these textile investments were illusory.” An objective observer would have seen the flaw in the arguments offered in support of such investments. The industry was plagued by an overabundance of capacity. In the past, there had been a terrible misinvestment of capital that diverted a great flood of money into a seemingly attractive industry. Unfortunately, that capital did not go into easy to recoup investments. It went into massive expenditures that saddled the owners with high fixed costs. A factory that produces nothing is worse less than nothing. It’s a money pit. The owner has only two choices: exit the business or attempt to obtain the most favorable variable costs by any means necessary. If enough players opt for the latter the game is no fun for anyone. “Many of our competitors, both domestic and foreign, were stepping up to the same kind of expenditures and, once enough companies did so, their reduced costs became the baseline for reduced prices industrywide. Viewed individually, each company’s capital investment decision appeared cost-effective and rational; viewed collectively, the decisions neutralized each other and were irrational (just as happens when each person watching a parade decides he can see a little better if he stands on tiptoes). After each round of investment, all the players had more money in the game and returns remained anemic.” The image of a crowd of parade watchers on tiptoes is a good one for investors to keep in mind. This is what a bad business looks like. This is the kind of investment you want to avoid. A corporation rarely exits a business on economically beneficial terms. It does so in its own time – long after the unending decline becomes obvious. An inflexible enterprise is one that is tied to a particular line of business, mode of production, or labor force. Most businesses are not as closely tied to these things as you might think. A few are. Xerox and Kodak (EK) are two examples from the recent past. General Motors (GM) is still tied to a labor force from a bygone era. GM is an example of a business that is so inflexible it is tied not only to a particular industry but to a particular position within the industry. The company was not structured in a way that allowed it to slim down in the event of a loss of market share. For some businesses, a shift in the structure of their market can be as disastrous as a shift in technology. The consequences of such shifts can be dire. The good news is that it is not difficult to see which companies are exposed to these future threats. General Motors was a huge, unionized enterprise. It held a very large share of the U.S. market. It obviously had to maintain its market share. That may not have on the mind of investors a few decades ago, because the idea that GM would lose market share might have seemed absurd. But, if they had considered the matter, they would have seen that GM’s survival was largely dependent upon maintaining a very large share of the U.S. market. Likewise, if Intel (INTC) or Microsoft (MSFT) lost much market share, they’d have to make huge changes very quickly. The current structure of those companies can’t be supported by a small share of the market. Of course, it would be much easier for these businesses to shed tens of thousands of employees than it is for General Motors. At the same time, no sane investor is buying shares of Intel or Microsoft unless he expects them to maintain roughly the same share of the market for their products that they currently control. Future market share is a key consideration at both these firms, because the weight of the expenses they have taken on would crush any company that is not the biggest player in the industry. The companies literally employ small armies. In fact, the combined workforce of these two companies is no less than the number of U.S. troops in Iraq. So, clearly both companies have made rather large commitments predicated upon their continued dominance. Without that dominance, these commitments would become crushing burdens. You need to give some thought to the flexibility of any business you invest in. The greatest risk facing a large enterprise is a decrease in revenues that can not (or will not) be offset by a similar decrease in expenses. The “will not” part is important, because I’ve learned that it is easy to put too much faith in management. No one likes to make tough decisions. The fact that a problem is obvious does not mean those who understand the problem will necessarily seek to solve it. I have no doubt that many in Congress recognize that the national debt is a problem. I also have no doubt that they recognize it is not in their interest to address the problem. They would like to see someone else address it at a later date. Everyone would. It is too easy to rationalize a thousand small steps. Then, you never have to admit your one big mistake. It may be that no one consciously chooses to tie a business to an inflexible and potentially perilous position. Likewise, it may be that no one consciously chooses to continue down that path. But, that is often precisely what happens. If the problem is not addressed until it must be addressed, it is too late for the owners. The losses in both time and money are already too great. Therefore, it may be best to look for businesses where managers will not be required to make tough decisions. An investment based upon the belief that managers will make tough decisions is always a risky investment – regardless of the fundamentals.

On Valley National Bancorp

Valley National Bancorp (VLY) is a conservative bank with a strong position in northern New Jersey and a presence in Manhattan. The bank, founded in 1927, has about $12 billion in assets. Valley has consistently earned extraordinary returns on assets and equity. Over the last twenty years, Valley has averaged a 1.74% return on assets and a 21.12% return on equity. Valley’s worst two-year performance occurred in 1990 and 1991. During that period, Valley’s return on equity dropped as low as 14.54% and its ROA dropped as low as 1.29%. Even in Valley’s worst year (1991), the company still managed to roughly match the average long-term performance of most of its peers. In other words, Valley’s worst year was a close to typical year for many other banks. It was at this low-point in 1991 that the board of directors decided not to increase the cash dividend. That was the only year in the last 37 that Valley did not increase its dividend. The company has 79 consecutive years of profitable operations. That’s over 300 quarters (Valley has yet to post a quarterly loss). More importantly, Valley has a record of earning great returns on both assets and equity over long periods of time. So, what’s the company’s secret? Location Northern New Jersey is about the best place in the world to situate a bank. This isn’t hyperbole; if there’s a better location, I’ve yet to hear of it. As you know, American banks are unusually profitable. The market is large and highly fragmented. So, naturally the best place to situate a bank would be in the United States. But, why north Jersey in particular? In a September 20th, 2001 interview with The Wall Street Transcript, Valley’s chairman, Gerald Lipkin explained why northern New Jersey is such an attractive market: "Northern New Jersey is the single most densely populated area on earth. There are more people per square mile in northern New Jersey than there are in India, China, Japan or anyplace else. We have the highest median family income in the United States in that area. So, we serve a very densely populated and affluent area, which is not dominated by any single industry." Focus Valley maintains a narrow focus both in terms of geography and services. The company’s offices are kept within one hour of the bank’s headquarters in Wayne, NJ. In the same interview, Mr. Lipkin explained why this geographic concentration is important: “We like to make it very convenient for our client base to meet with senior management as well as the other members of our staff." Valley focuses on relationship banking. The company has residency requirements for its directors. The majority of directors are to live within 100 miles of the corporate headquarters. Furthermore, each board member is required to use Valley for both business and personal accounts. Theoretically, these two requirements ensure board members are familiar with the bank’s services and are best able to understand the needs of local businesses. Discipline Valley has a history of highly disciplined lending. Charge-offs are immaterial. Current reserves are adequate to cover many years of future charge-offs with little difficulty. The company’s asset quality ratios and loan to value ratios both indicate Valley has a more conservative approach to lending than many of its peers. Undoubtedly, the local economy is helpful in this regard. Valley does not need to make questionable loans, because there is an abundance of opportunity in the local area. It is possible for the bank to remain fairly selective without forfeiting growth entirely. For instance, despite having $12 billion in assets, Valley only has about a 6% market share in northern New Jersey. Management Banking, like insurance, is a business where a particularly good or particularly poor management can greatly affect long-term results. The current Chairman, President, and CEO, Gerald Lipkin, has served for just over thirty years now. His record is unblemished. Of course, the real responsibility for avoiding mistakes lies with others in the organization. There are few businesses where individual employees can do as much harm as they can within a bank. Valley’s past record and the level of experience of its top managers suggests investors should encounter very few unpleasant surprises resulting from human error. Mr. Lipkin made his management philosophy quite clear with his concluding remarks in the aforementioned 2001 interview with The Wall Street Transcript: "We never bet the ranch – we never put the bank in harms way on any single issue that could really harm it. Lending money is a risk taking business. So, obviously we at times have problems, situations with individual loans, but we try to avoid concentrations that could create major problems." Valuation Valley National Bancorp is a solid, well-run bank operating in a geographic area with excellent economics. The company’s physical footprint and its existing relationships give it a narrow moat in a highly profitable (and increasingly competitive) region. Unfortunately, the company is trading at more than three times book. Three times book is a lot to pay for any bank. Valley’s future growth will likely be somewhat restrained by the company’s conservative approach. Therefore, dividends are going to make up a significant portion of an investor’s total returns. Conclusion Valley is a good bank. It has a real moat, albeit a narrow one. Competition is increasing within Valley’s territory. However, the company has been able to compete successfully with new entrants (who tend to take on far less profitable business). The stock isn’t cheap today, but there is one wrinkle worth keeping in mind. Valley is more dependent upon interest rate spreads than most banks. If the yield curve was to become significantly steeper, Valley would reap outsized rewards. The current dividend yield on a share of Valley National Bancorp is a little less than 3.5%. Considering the company’s limited growth prospects, this is an unattractive yield. If, during a period of general uncertainty within the banking industry, shares of VLY were to trade closer to two times book, investors would have an opportunity to make a long-term commitment in a quality bank.

An Analysis of Wells Fargo & Company (WFC)

Copyright 2006 Geoff Gannon

Wells Fargo & Company (WFC) is a huge Western and Midwestern bank that provides a diverse array of financial services to its more than 23 million customers. The company employs more than 150,000 people at its over 6,000 locations nationwide. Wells Fargo has about $500 billion in assets.

While the company continues to derive more than half its revenues from interest income (about $26 billion), its activities are not limited to collecting deposits and lending money. Wells Fargo engages in other businesses such as brokerage services, asset management, and investment banking. The company also makes venture capital investments.

Over the last ten years, Wells Fargo has averaged a 1.57% return on assets and an 18.19% return on equity.

Location

Wells Fargo is closely associated with California in the minds of most investors. The company now operates in 23 different states. However, the concentration in California remains.

Mortgage lending in California accounts for approximately 14% of Wells Fargo’s total loan portfolio. Commercial real estate loans in California account for another 5% of the company’s total loans. No other single state accounts for a similarly sized portion of total loans. In fact, neither mortgage lending nor commercial real estate lending in any other state accounts for more than 2% of Wells Fargo’s total loans.

Cross-Selling

Wells Fargo’s focus on cross-selling is well known. The company has a stated goal of doubling the number of products the average consumer and business customer has with Wells Fargo to eight products per customer (from the current four products per customer).

Cross-selling increases customer stickiness. It also helps increase profitability by decreasing expenses relative to revenues. The need for a large physical footprint is reduced – as is the need for a large number of bankers. Instead, the existing infrastructure is able to provide additional revenue from the same customers.

Wells Fargo’s Chairman & CEO, Richard Kovacevich, explains the importance of the company’s cross-selling in the “Vision & Values” section of the corporate website:

"Cross-selling — or what we call “needs-based” selling — is our most important strategy. Why? Because it is an “increasing returns” business model. It’s like the “network effect” of e-commerce. It multiplies opportunities geometrically. The more you sell customers the more you know about them. The more you know about them the easier it is to sell them more products. The more products customers have with you the better value they receive and the more loyal they are. The longer they stay with you the more opportunities you have to meet even more of their financial needs. The more you sell them the higher the profit because the added cost of selling another product to an existing customer is often only about ten percent of the cost of selling that same product to a new customer. This gives us—as an aggregator — a significant cost advantage over one product or one channel companies. Cross-selling re-invents how financial services are aggregated and sold to customers — just like other aggregators such as Wal-Mart (general merchandise), Home Depot (home improvement products) and Staples (office supplies)."

Mr. Kovacevich’s enthusiasm for the cross-selling model is well justified. It is difficult to quantify the importance of meeting all the varied needs of your customers, because you can not measure the opportunities you missed. However, it is obvious that reducing each customer’s interest in considering a competitor’s services will greatly increase long-term profitability for any company engaged in any line of business – not just for a bank.

Later, in the same website section, Mr. Kovacevich addresses the importance of customer stickiness:

"(Cross-selling) is our most important customer-related sales metric. We want to earn 100 percent of our customers’ business. The more products customers have with Wells Fargo the better deal they get, the more loyal they are, and the longer they stay with the company, improving retention. Eighty percent of our revenue growth comes from selling more products to existing customers."

This focus on retention is an important part of a long-term plan to maintain Wells Fargo’s above-average returns on assets and equity. Extraordinary profitability comes from differentiating your product or service from those of your competitors. Increasing customer stickiness and reducing “comparison shopping” is a key part of maintaining extraordinary profitability.

Some businesses are blessed with enviable economics because of their product’s natural prominence in the minds of their customers. Most businesses are obsessed with market share. But, how many really think about “mind share”? Obviously, a product like Coke (KO), Hershey (HSY), or Snickers is going to have a positive association in the minds of consumers.

For many people, these products will also have a prominent place in each customer’s mind (relative to other products and services on which money can be spent). A few other businesses have a healthy mind share without the positive association; GEICO is the most obvious example. The company’s brand conjures up nothing but the words “auto insurance”. Of course, that’s all the GEICO brand has to do.

So, what does all this have to do with Wells Fargo? Mind share isn’t just the result of exposure to advertising. In fact, in most cases, exposure to advertising can not duplicate the kind of results that a direct, differentiated experience creates. Entertainment properties are by far the leaders in mind share. People who saw and loved Star Wars remember the film. In fact, they don’t just remember the film, they actually file it away (or, more precisely, cross reference it) in countless ways within their mind.

The evidence for this particular example is abundant. There are countless references to Star Wars in other media. The name, the music, the opening text and countless other elements are immediately recognizable. Even the films Star Wars fans hated made more money than almost any other movies in the history of cinema – and this was decades after the original came out. So, obviously Star Wars has the kind of lasting mind share any business should aspire to if it hopes to continuously earn extraordinary profits.

Unfortunately, most businesses, however well run, can not attain this kind of mind share. The products and services they provide can never be as differentiated and memorable as a motion picture. Just as importantly, the positive associations will not be present, simply because the product or service is not inherently exciting, entertaining, or pleasant. This is clearly the case in financial services.

So, what can a financial services company do to improve its mind share? The most obvious tactic is simply to “wow” its customers. In fact, Wells Fargo’s CEO discusses this particular option in the “Vision and Values” section of the company’s website:

" We have to 'wow!' them. We know what that feels like because we’re all customers. We go to the cleaners, the grocery store, a restaurant or whatever, and we find a situation where we’re 'wowed!' We walk out and we say, those people really listened to me and helped me get what I need. All of us hear stories about customers, say, who pick a certain line at the supermarket because they know the person who bags the groceries connects with customers — smiles, greets regular customers by name, asks how their families are doing. When a personal banker helps a customer in one of our stores, or when a customer gets help from one of our phone bankers or does transactions on wellsfargo.com we want them to say, 'That was great. I can’t wait to tell someone.'"

Another option worth pursuing is widening the associations present in the customer’s mind. Financial services is a business where associations tend to be more conscious, categorized, and hierarchical than the associations formed in more heavily branded businesses. Put simply, the (potential) customer usually thinks of a “set” before thinking of an “element” within that set. Like many mental associations, the information can be returned in either direction. For example, the customer may normally think “banks” and then think “Wells Fargo”, but will also be able to return the word “bank” if prompted by the name “Wells Fargo”. This categorization is important, because it provides (limited) permission for Wells Fargo to expand its mind share horizontally (across service categories).

In other words, providing a diverse range of financial services doesn’t just make sense from the provider’s perspective, it also makes sense from the user’s perspective, because the user of financial services has already grouped deposits, borrowing, credit cards, insurance, brokerage services, asset management, etc. together in a very loose way within his mind. As a result of this mental network, one positive experience with Wells Fargo will greatly affect a customer’s desire to pay for an additional service, even if the two services are not really all that similar.

The three key elements here are: a broader definition of what Wells Fargo is (a place that does “money things”, not just a bank), a positive experience, and some sense of trust that the quality of service will be consistent. The last requirement is the easiest to meet, because it’s natural for a customer to assume that the positive experience was not a fluke, much the way a diner assumes the good meal he had at a particular restaurant was not caused by his picking the best offering from the menu. The diner usually assumes the overall quality of the restaurant’s various entrees is superior. Likewise, a good experience with one of Wells Fargo’s products or services will likely rub off on its other offerings.

Valuation

Shares of Wells Fargo currently yield just over 3%. The stock trades at a price-to-book ratio of just under 2.75 and a price-to-earnings ratio of less than 15.

Conclusion

Over the last 5, 10, 15, and 20 years shareholders of Wells Fargo & Company have fared better than the S&P 500. As of the end of last year, WFC’s total return over the last ten years was 17% vs. 9% for the S&P. Over the last 20 years, WFC outpaced the S&P 500 by an even wider margin: 21% vs. 12%.

Wells Fargo has a stellar reputation with investors. The company is the only U.S. bank to earn Moody’s highest credit rating. Wells Fargo also boasts a well-known major shareholder. The largest owner of the company’s common stock is Berkshire Hathaway. Warren Buffett’s holding company has a roughly 5.5% stake in Wells Fargo. Berkshire’s last reported purchase occurred during the first quarter of this year.

Wells Fargo has a stated goal of achieving double-digit growth in earnings and revenue while managing a return on assets over 1.75% and a return on equity over 20%. Those are both very ambitious goals. The company has achieved some of the highest returns on assets and equity of any major U.S. bank. However, Wells Fargo will probably need to increase the percentage of revenue it derives from fee businesses if it is to achieve these goals.

In the years ahead, the company may well become more of a diversified financial services business. In fact, that’s what I expect will happen. The company’s commitment to cross-selling is not some fad. Eventually, this commitment will change the way investors think about Wells Fargo. Soon, it may be considered much more than a bank.

Wells Fargo’s CEO makes the case that his company’s P/E is simply too low. Wells Fargo has a solid history of strong growth and profitability. So, why should it be valued similarly to most other banks? Shouldn’t it be awarded a multiple more in line with a growth company?

There’s actually some merit to this argument. Wells Fargo is unusually well positioned for a bank. Often, those banks that seem certain to earn very high returns on assets and equity for many years to come are poorly positioned for future growth. These banks are often smaller than their competitors and focused on a specific geographic niche. Any acquisitions would dilute the exceptional profitability of the bank’s niche.

Of course, there are also many consolidators in the banking industry. Unfortunately, many of these banks do not have a history of earning the kind of returns on assets and equity that Wells Fargo has achieved. Even more importantly, there is little differentiation between these titans of the banking industry and their national competitors. Therefore, their moats are highly suspect.

Wells Fargo is a different kind of bank. It has a history of extraordinary growth and profitability. There are two obvious opportunities for future growth: geographic expansion and cross-selling. Of these two opportunities, it's clear I’m more enamored with the latter. An eastward push is not necessary, and certainly not via an ill-advised acquisition.

There is a lot of value in the Wells Fargo franchise and there is plenty of room within that franchise for future growth. That’s one of the great advantages of the financial services industry. With the right model, limits to growth are almost non-existent. In other highly-profitable industries, there is often nowhere to reinvest new capital at a similar rate of return.

If Wells Fargo is a growth stock, it is a peculiar sort of growth stock. Maybe that is what attracted Buffett to the company in the first place. Here is a business with a strong franchise that can grow for many years to come. Perhaps most importantly, it is a growth business that frequently trades in the market at value like multiples, simply because it’s a bank.

At the current market price, Wells Fargo is the sort of investment you make once and forget. The valuation is not so cheap as to promise a good return if the business falters. But, the business is not so suspect as to require the margin of safety be provided by a low P/E ratio. Sometimes, near certain growth is the margin of safety.

An Analysis of Valley National Bancorp (VLY)

Copyright 2006 Geoff Gannon

Valley National Bancorp (VLY) is a conservative bank with a strong position in northern New Jersey and a presence in Manhattan. The bank, founded in 1927, has about $12 billion in assets.

Valley has consistently earned extraordinary returns on assets and equity. Over the last twenty years, Valley has averaged a 1.74% return on assets and a 21.12% return on equity.

Valley’s worst two-year performance occurred in 1990 and 1991. During that period, Valley’s return on equity dropped as low as 14.54% and its ROA dropped as low as 1.29%. Even in Valley’s worst year (1991), the company still managed to roughly match the average long-term performance of most of its peers. In other words, Valley’s worst year was a close to typical year for many other banks.

It was at this low-point in 1991 that the board of directors decided not to increase the cash dividend. That was the only year in the last 37 that Valley did not increase its dividend.

The company has 79 consecutive years of profitable operations. That’s over 300 quarters (Valley has yet to post a quarterly loss). More importantly, Valley has a record of earning great returns on both assets and equity over long periods of time. So, what’s the company’s secret?

Location

Northern New Jersey is about the best place in the world to situate a bank. This isn’t hyperbole; if there’s a better location, I’ve yet to hear of it. As you know, American banks are unusually profitable. The market is large and highly fragmented. So, naturally the best place to situate a bank would be in the United States. But, why north Jersey in particular?

In a September 20th, 2001 interview with The Wall Street Transcript, Valley’s chairman, Gerald Lipkin, explained why northern New Jersey is such an attractive market:

"Northern New Jersey is the single most densely populated area on earth. There are more people per square mile in northern New Jersey than there are in India, China, Japan or anyplace else. We have the highest median family income in the United States in that area. So, we serve a very densely populated and affluent area, which is not dominated by any single industry."

Focus

Valley maintains a narrow focus both in terms of geography and services. The company’s offices are kept within one hour of the bank’s headquarters in Wayne, NJ. In the same interview, Mr. Lipkin explained why this geographic concentration is important: “We like to make it very convenient for our client base to meet with senior management as well as the other members of our staff."

Valley focuses on relationship banking. The company has residency requirements for its directors. The majority of directors are to live within 100 miles of the corporate headquarters. Furthermore, each board member is required to use Valley for both business and personal accounts. Theoretically, these two requirements ensure board members are familiar with the bank’s services and are best able to understand the needs of local businesses.

Discipline

Valley has a history of highly disciplined lending. Charge-offs are immaterial. Current reserves are adequate to cover many years of future charge-offs with little difficulty. The company’s asset quality ratios and loan to value ratios both indicate Valley has a more conservative approach to lending than many of its peers.

Undoubtedly, the local economy is helpful in this regard. Valley does not need to make questionable loans, because there is an abundance of opportunity in the local area. It is possible for the bank to remain fairly selective without forfeiting growth entirely. For instance, despite having $12 billion in assets, Valley only has about a 6% market share in northern New Jersey.

Management

Banking, like insurance, is a business where a particularly good or particularly poor management can greatly affect long-term results. The current Chairman, President, and CEO, Gerald Lipkin, has served for just over thirty years now. His record is unblemished.

Of course, the real responsibility for avoiding mistakes lies with others in the organization. There are few businesses where individual employees can do as much harm as they can within a bank. Valley’s past record and the level of experience of its top managers suggests investors should encounter very few unpleasant surprises resulting from human error.

Mr. Lipkin made his management philosophy quite clear with his concluding remarks in the aforementioned 2001 interview with The Wall Street Transcript:

"We never bet the ranch – we never put the bank in harms way on any single issue that could really harm it. Lending money is a risk taking business. So, obviously we at times have problems, situations with individual loans, but we try to avoid concentrations that could create major problems."



Valuation

Valley National Bancorp is a solid, well-run bank operating in a geographic area with excellent economics. The company’s physical footprint and its existing relationships give it a narrow moat in a highly profitable (and increasingly competitive) region.

Unfortunately, the company is trading at more than three times book. Three times book is a lot to pay for any bank. Valley’s future growth will likely be somewhat restrained by the company’s conservative approach. Therefore, dividends are going to make up a significant portion of an investor’s total returns.

Conclusion

Valley is a good bank. It has a real moat, albeit a narrow one. Competition is increasing within Valley’s territory. However, the company has been able to compete successfully with new entrants (who tend to take on far less profitable business).

The stock isn’t cheap today, but there is one wrinkle worth keeping in mind. Valley is more dependent upon interest rate spreads than most banks. If the yield curve was to become significantly steeper, Valley would reap outsized rewards.

The current dividend yield on a share of Valley National Bancorp is a little less than 3.5%. Considering the company’s limited growth prospects, this is an unattractive yield. If, during a period of general uncertainty within the banking industry, shares of VLY were to trade closer to two times book, investors would have an opportunity to make a long-term commitment in a quality bank.

5 Ways To Save Money On Your Car’s Gasoline

With gasoline prices steadily on the rise, many commuters are finding it more and more difficult to justify spending their hard earned money on the high cost of fuel rather than other necessities, including food and electricity. With that in mind, there are five simple steps that you can take to help stretch your dollar a little bit farther when it comes to your car’s fuel consumption.

Carpool. If you have children who are in school, consider sharing the driving responsibility with other mothers that live nearby. This is especially helpful if you can alternate days. Perhaps you would drive the children on Monday and Wednesday, while the other women fill in on the rest of the weekdays. This will save you money on gasoline and will also make the children’s ride to school a lot of fun because they will be riding with friends. The same is true of commuters on their way to work, who can share in the responsibility and costs of driving amongst one another.

Buy a smaller car. If you own an SUV or other large vehicle, your gas mileage per gallon will be less than if you were to own a smaller car. As a general rule, larger vehicles just normally use more gasoline. If you want to save money on the cost of fuel, buying a smaller car is a good start.

Purchase a hybrid car. These cars are fairly new on the market and are still quite expensive, but many find the benefits outweigh the high cost when they figure in their savings on fuel. Hybrid cars usually get better gas mileage per gallon and this results in big savings for the owner.

Turn off the ignition. If you are stuck in traffic that is moving about an inch per minute, then just put the car in park and turn the ignition off. While sitting in traffic, you are just using more and more gasoline and aren’t really getting anywhere. Rather than waste, try to save money by not leaving your car running in parking lots or your driveway. If you need to stop by the store and will just be gone for a minute, take the time to turn the ignition off. In addition to saving on gasoline, you will be ensuring that your car isn’t stolen by turning off the ignition and taking your keys inside the store with you. Many people would be surprised to know how many shoppers actually leave their car running while in the store.

Walk. If you live near a store, walk instead of driving. This will save not only in the price of your car’s gasoline, but also in the general everyday wear and tear that your car receives by being out on the road. No to mention, walking is good exercise and is generally safe for most people. So why not walk off some of those pesky winter pounds and save some money on gasoline in the process.

The aforementioned ways are five of the most popular to help you save some extra money where fuel is concerned. Some of the more obvious ways are to stock up when gasoline is decreasing in price. If you get $10 or $15 worth of gasoline every few days, you may get a good price one day and a terrible cost per gallon during the next trip. However, if you fill up your car’s gasoline tank while prices are still low, you will be sure to get the best deal possible. Not only that, but you may also end up saving some time at the gas pump when all of the other consumers are waiting in line to fill up before the prices go even higher.